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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the State of Utah 
RAY PHEBUS, JOE T. JUHAN, and 
~\SHLEY Y ALLEY OIL C0l\1P ANY, 
a corporation, 
VS. 
Plaintiffs and 
Petitioners 
"\Y~I. ST~\XLEY DUNFORD, Judge of 
the District Court, Uintah County, and 
N. J. ~\IE_\GHER, 
Def,enifunts and 
Respondents 
PETITIONERS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
7187 
This is an original mandamus proceeding to compel 
the trial judge to conform to the mandate of this court 
after appeal and the issuance of the remittitur. The 
judgment appealed from quieted title to real property 
against the appealing defendants, including Ray Phebus, 
one of the plaintiffs and petitione~s herein, assessing 
costs against them and restraining them and those claim-
ing or to claim by, through or under any of them from 
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2 
going into possession of the property or asserting any 
adverse claim thereto. Upon the appeal this court re-
versed the decision of the lower court and remanded the 
case to that court for proceedings to conform to the 
opinion. 
Ray Phebus, one of the appeUants from the judg-
ment that was revers·ed, seeks by this proceeding to have 
the judgment appealed from formally vacated of record 
and to be restored of record to the position that he was 
in prior to the entry of the erroneous judgment. Joe T. 
Juhan and kshley Valley Oil Company are interested 
parties and were co-defendants and appellants with Ray 
Phebus in the appear which resulted in the reversal. As 
to them, the trial court vacated of record the judgment 
appealed from, but, as interested parties, they join as 
plaintiffs and petitioners. 
There is no controverted issue of fact herein. The 
facts, as set forth in the petition for an alternative writ 
of mandamus, as adrnited by the return or answer on 
file herein, can be briefly summarized as follows.: 
1. Honorable Wm. Stanley Dunford was the trial 
judge in the action commenced on December 5th, 1944 
in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District in 
and for Uintah County, Utah, wherein N. J. Meagher, 
one of the defendants. and respondents herein, is plaintiff 
and your petitioners together with others are defend-
ants, and which action was brought to quiet title to cer-
tain lands situate in Uintah County, Utah; that judg-
ment was entered in said action in favor of the plain-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
tiff Meagher on or about April 15th, 1946, quieting ptain-
tiff's title to said real property and adjudging, among 
other things, the following: 
(a) 'That all adverse claims of the defendants, in-
cluding petitioners herein, in the lands above described 
or any part thereof and all persons claiming or attempt-
ing to claim any interest therein by, through or under 
the said defendants, or any of them, were invalid and 
groundless. 
(h) That an oil and gas ·lease of June 4th, 1924 and 
a :Modification Agreement of May 21, 1927 were invalid 
and of no force and effect and cancelled. 
(c) That the said Meagher was the true and law-
ful owner of all rights, titles and interests in the lands 
above described, e:x:cept for a right of way and royalty 
interests in said decree specified. 
(d) That the title to said lands be quieted against 
all claims or demands or pretensions of the said defend-
ants or any of them, and that the said defendants, and 
each of them, including the petitioners herein, be per-
petually enjoined from asserting any claim to said lands 
or any part thereof. 
(e) That the said Meagher have judgment against 
the defendants, Ray Phebus, Joe T. Juhan and Ashley 
Valley Oil Company, petitioners herein, for costs and 
disbursements amounting to the sum of $32.30. 
2. That following the entry of said judgment your 
petitioners, Ray Phebus, Joe T. Juhan and Ashley 
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Valley Oil Company duly appealed to this court, the 
appeal being known as case number 6972, and on the 27th 
day of October, 1947 this court rendered its opinion on 
said appeal, by which the decision of the lower court was 
reversed and the case remanded to that court for pro-
ceedings to conform to the opinion, the decision being 
report'ed in the case of Me,agher v. Uintah Gas Co. et 
al, 185 Pac. 2d 747; that 'the remittitur thereon was filed 
with the Clerk of the District Court of Uintah County, 
Utah on the 18th day of March, 1948. 
3. That on the 23rd day of Aprii, 1948 in open court 
at Yernal, Uintah County, Utah, before 'the District Court 
of said county, Honorable Wm. Stanley Dunford, one of 
the defendants and respondents herein, presiding, your 
petitoners moved the court for an order vacating and 
setting aside the judgment and decree of said court pur-
suant to the decision and mandate of this court in its 
case number 6972; that the motion was granted as to 
the petitioners Joe T. Juhan and Ashley Valley Oil Com-
pany, hut that the trial court failed, refused 'and ne-
glected and still does fail, refus·e and neglect to set 
aside and vacate said judgment and decree as to Ray 
Phebus. In this connection it is alleged that the trial 
court wholly ignored and failed to follow and abide by 
the mandate and decision of this court aforesaid, hut the 
defendants and respondents, by their answer herein, 
assert in effect, by denial, that the trial court in grant-
ing the motion as to Joe T. Juhan and A:shley V'alley 
Oil Company and refusing to grant it as to Ray Phebus 
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5 
did not ignore or fail to follow or abide by said man-
date and decision. 
-!. That notwithstanding the mandate and decision 
of this court on the appeal in the aforesaid action, the 
trial judge, in refusing to set aside and vacate the 
judgment and decree appealed from as to yourlpetitioner, 
Ray Phebus, holds and asserts the former judgment and 
decree to be valid and effective as against the said Ray 
Phebus and does thereby prejudice the rights and in-
terests of petitioners, Joe T. Juhan and Ashley V ailey 
Oil Company in and to said lands. As to this, the de. 
fendants and respondents, ·by their answer, deny that in 
the refusal to set aside and vacate the judgment and de. 
cree appealed from as to Ray Phebus, the rights and in-
terests of Joe T. Juhan and Ashley Valley Oil Company 
have been or are in anyway prejudiced. 
5. It is alleged that plaintiffs and petitioners have 
no plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary 
course of law and that it is the duty of the defendant, 
Wm. Stanley Dunford, as such District Judge, to forth-
with vacate and set aside the judgment and decr·ee ap-
pealed from as against all of the defendants in said 
action and, particularly, the defendant Ray Phebus, one 
of the petitioners herein. These allegations, by the ans-
wer of the defendants and respondents, are denied. 
6. The defendants and respondents affirmatively 
allege that the petitioners have a plain, speedy and ade-
quate remedy in the ordinary course of law hy pres~ent­
ing to the defendant judge their propos·ed Findings of 
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Fact, Conclusions and Decree, which they have so far 
not done; that the order entered by the trial judge on 
May 4th, 1948, following the motion of April 23rd, 1948 
by which the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Decree in so far as the same affect the rights of Ashley 
Valley Oil Company and Joe T. Juhan were vacated 
and set aside, omitting Ray Phebus therefrom, was in 
all respects in conformity with the decision of this court. 
'The judgment in the action appea~ed from was 
against all three of the plaintiffs and petitioners herein 
and all three joined in the appeal. The reversal of th'e 
judgment affected all three of the appealing defendants 
alike, but, that, notwithstanding the trial judge in re-
fusing to vacate the judgment against Ray Phebus in 
effect holds, and by necessary implication does hold, the 
title of Meagher, the prevailing party in the judgment 
aJppea:led from, to he quieted as against Phebus and all 
claiming or to claim by, through or under him in and to 
the real property affected by said decree, the restrain-
ing order to be in effect as against him and all claiming 
by, through or under him, and in full force and effect 
as to costs awarded against Phebus in the trial of the 
action and upon which execution might issue. The effect 
of the order continues the judgment lien for costs as 
against all real property that Phebus might have in said 
county or ~elsewhere where the judgment might be 
docketed. This court is now asked to order th·e trial judge 
to vacate of record its judgment subs·equent1y reversed 
as to all of the appealing parties and, particularly, peti-
tioner Ray Phebus. 
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ARGUMENT 
Upon the filing of the remittitur after appeal, the 
defendant judge was asked to forma:lly remove, by de-
claring it to be a nullity, the 'encumbrance of record of 
its judg~nent which this court held to be without sub-
stance. The duty of the defendant judge in that particular 
and the reasons and points and authorities to support 
the issuance of the writ of mandamus in this action 
prayed for, involve a consideration of the following: 
1. Effect of Reversal on Appeal and Remand Without 
Specific Instructions. 
The opinion of this court in l\1eagher v. Uintah Gas 
Co., et al, case number 6972, and which for conv·enience 
will be hereinafter referred to ~by the caS'e number, con-
tains the following language: ., 'The decision of the lower 
court is reversed, and the case remanded to that court 
for proceedings to conform to this opinion. Costs to 
appellants." The effect of the reversal with directions 
to proceed in conformity with the views expressed in the 
opinion fHed puts the case in the same position in the 
court below as if no decree had ever been entered. In 
the case of Larsen v. Gasb,erg, 43 Utah 203, 134 Pac. 885, 
this court held: 
"The rule is well settled that, where a j1.~dg­
ment is reV!Brsed and a new trial grant.ed without 
any specific instruct~ons or directions, the case 
stands in the lower court precisely ,as it did b~efore 
a trial was had in the first instance. 'The general 
rule in thiis regard is well stated in 3 Ency. L. & 
P. 579, in the following language: 'When a decree 
' 
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is reversed and the cause remanded without spe-
cific directions, the decision of the court below 
is ~entire'ly abrogated, and the cause then stands in 
the court below precisely as if no trial had occur-
red, and that court h'as the same power over the 
record as it had before its decree was rendered, 
and it may permit amendments to the 1prleadings to 
the same extent that it might have done before the 
trial, and in the exercise of the same discretion, 
except that it is concluded by the legal principles 
announced by the appell'ate court. And where a 
cause is reversed and remanded with directions to 
proceed in conformity with the views expressed 
in the opmion filed, and it appears from such 
opinion that the grounds of reversal are of a 
character which may be obviated by subsequent 
amendments of the pleadings or the introduction 
of additional evidence, it is the duty of the trial 
'Court to permit the cause to be redocketed and to 
permit amendments to be made and evidence intro-
duced on the hearing just as though it was then 
being heard for the first time.' The doctrine is 
tersely, and we think correctly, stated in 1 Ency. 
Pl. & Pr. 618, as follows: 'Where the appellate 
court reverses a judgment and remands the cause 
generally without any specific directions, amend-
ments to the pleadings may be allowed upon the 
reinstatement of the case in the court below as 
if it had never been tried, although the appellate 
court may have adjudged the pleadings insuf-
ficient on demurrer.' Of course, as stated on page 
620 of the same work, 'a 'party should not he al-
lowed to amend so as to reopen questions which 
have been adjudicated hy the appellate court.' '' 
(Italics ours). 
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To the same effect is the expression of this court 
in the case of TV,arren v. Robis1ovn, 21 Utah 429, 61 Pac. 
28: 
''It will be noticed that the case was not 're-
versed and remanded,' but simply 'remanded,' 
with directions to 'proceed'; that is, 1sent hack to 
the court below to proceed, the same as if no 
judgment of nonsuit had heen entered, according 
to the rules of law announced in the opinion as 
governing the case. * * * In Hawkins v. Railway 
Co., 39 C.C.A. 538, 99 Fed. 322, ~as appears from 
the syllabus, it was held: 'When a decree is re-
versed, and the mandate doe1s not direct the entry 
of any particular decree, hut only th3it further 
proceeding be had not inconsistent with the opin-
ion of the appellate court, the effect is to put the 
case in the same position in the court below as if 
no decree had ever been entered, and the court 
has the same authority to permit amendments of 
the pleadings to enlarge the issues, and admit 
further proofs, a1s it had before the entry of the 
decree.' Nelson v. Hubbard, 13 Ark. 2'53; Wool-
man v. Garringer, 3 Mont. 405; Commissioners 
v. Carey, 1 Ohio St. 463; West v. Brashear, 14 
Pet. 51, 10 L. Ed. 350; Supervisors v. Kennicott, 
94 U. S. 498, 24 L. Ed. 260; In re Banford Fork 
& Tool Co., 160 U. S. 247, 16 Sup. Ct. 291, 40 L. 
Ed. 414; Ex parte Sibbald, 12 Pet. 4&8, 9 L. Ed. 
1167. And, where an a'Ppeal is taken from a judg-
ment of an inferior court entered under a mandate 
of the appellate court, the latter tribunal will 
construe its own mandate in connection with its 
opinion, to determine whether the inferior court 
proceeded in accordance therewith. Gaines v. 
Rugg, 148 U. S. 228, 13 Sup. Ct. 611, 37 L. Ed. 
432; In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co., supra.'' 
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The general rule is stated in HOI!}ne New Trw 'OI1Itd 
Appeal, Vol. 2, Sec. 299, pp. 1722-1723, as follows : 
''The reversal of the judgment leaves the 
litigation in the situation it was in prior to entry 
thereof. The parties are in the same position as if 
no judgment had been rendered. 'When the order 
... was reversed, it no longer had any vitality or 
force, and the result was to leave the proceeding 
where it stood before that order was made.' When 
a decree. is reversed, it is vacated, and the matter 
stands 'as though no decree had ever been made.' 
'When the order of the supreme court in the case 
of L·ondon etc. Bank v. Bandma.nn, 120 Cal. 220, 
was made, reversing the judgment of the court 
below, that judgment was forthwith vacated, and 
until action was taken by the court below in pur-
suance of the mandate to enter another judgment 
in accordance with the opinion of the supreme 
court, tihere was no judgment in ·existence in the 
case.' 
''Nor is the effect essentially otherwise even 
though the judgment of reversal may be accom-
panied with modifying words. In ·the case of Cow-
dery v. London etc Bank, already cited in this 
connection, it was held that the legal effect of a 
reversal of the judgment with directions to enter 
judgment in accordance with the view expressed 
is to vacate the decree so reversed, and leave it 
as if it had never been rendered, although the 
mandate is in form a modification, ~and the trial 
court has received no specific directions as to the 
particular form of modified decree authorized. It 
was further said that the appellate court might 
have modified ~the decree, but, as it did not, no 
vitality is left therein for any purpose, and a new 
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decree n1ust be entered. The case stands as an 
action pending with final judgment remaining to 
be entered." (Italics ours) 
To the same effect is Bancroft's Oode Practice awd 
Remedies, Yol. ~l, Sec. 7 403, pp. 9734-9735: 
''The effect of an unqualified reversal of a 
judgement is to vacate the judgment and render 
it without vitality or force. The proceeding is left 
where it stood before the judgment or order was 
made, and the parties stand in the same position 
as if no judgment or order had ever been rendered 
or made, with the exception that the opinion of 
the court on appeal must be followed so far, as 
applicable. If the cause is reversed for a new trial 
or for further proceedings in the lower court, 
a mandate is usually required, but thi1s is a matter 
which is treated in another chapter.'' · 
The expression used in Hayne New Trial and Appeal, 
supra, where the author quotes from London etc. Bl(Jtnk 
v. Bandmamn, 120 Cal. 220, to the ·effect that the order 
of the Supreme Court reversing the judgment of the court 
below "forthwith vacated" the former judgment is the 
closest expression that we have found to the effect that 
the decision of the Supreme Court is self-executing. There 
is no specific provision in our Code, so far as we can 
determine, relating to the mechanics of removing frorn 
the record the cloud of the erroneous and reversed judg-
ment in a suit where titl~e to real property is involved, 
unless it can be said that the decision of this court auto-
matically, and without more, accomplishes complete resti-
tution in that regard. 
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By the rule stated in the foregoing authorities, it 
might he said that the motion made before the trial court 
to vacat·e and set aside its erroneous judgment and de-
cree was unnecessary, but befo~e coming to that con-
clusion, the practical aspoots of the situation should be 
born in mind. In the first place, the judgment and decree 
appealed from restrained the defendants from going 
into possession of the pro;perty involved and from as-
serting any adverse claim thereto. Orderly procedure and 
due respect for the decree of a court of general juris-
diction would seem to us to encourage a formal motion 
to vacat·e. Furthermore, the judgment for costs, having 
been entered in a judgment docket and hecoming a lien 
attaching its-elf to all of the real property of the judg-
ment debtor, would immediately confront the examiner 
of the title to any real property in the name of the 
judgment debtor. The examiner would not necessarily 
know from an inspection of the judgment docket that 
the judgment of the trial court had been reversed. It is 
conceivable that the examiner of the record might in 
good faith require something more than a reference to 
expressions of the court in other cases to determine that 
the judgment had been vacated and s•et aside by a re-
versal. Good practice, it seems to us, would warrant the 
motion to vacate so as to remove all doubt but that the 
successful arprpealing de£endant was reinstated to the 
same position that he was in prior to the entry of the 
erroneous judgment. The petitioners herein, by their 
motions to vacate the •erroneous judgment, pursued a 
practice recognized as proper under the circumstances. 
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2. It is the Duty ofl the Trial ·Court tlo Vacate Its 
Judgment After Appeal and Reversal. 
In Reyn.olds v. Harris, 14 California 668, the court 
recognized a motion as being a proper remedy to vacate 
a judgment reversed on appeal; the court stating: 
''It is again said that the proper form of pro-
ceeding is by action in the usual form and not by 
motion, hut the authorities seem to he the other 
wa,y, and we see no reason why, in this class of 
cases, there should he an exception to the usual 
and recognized authority of the Courts to pre· 
vent or to remedy an injurious and illegal execu-
tion of the process of its officers. (See the fol-
lowing cases in which this authority of the Court 
has been upheld : 3 Johns, 'Ch. 4 7 4; 5 I d. 29 ; 
~Iobile Cotton Press vs. Moor & Magee, 9 Port. 
G79 ; 2 Yeates, 516; 1 Serg. & R. 2 Wend. 260; 7 
Id. 88, 7 Gill & J. 512; 7 J. J. Marsh. 625.) * * * 
"It is hard to see why a man buying in an-
other's property sold under a judgment rendered 
according to the forms of law, hut against the 
principl'es of law, should obtain any advantage 
from his own judgment thus improperly obtained. 
"It is true that as the error was the error of 
the Judge, he 'Should not lose by it, but it is not 
so clear that he should make a profit by it. It is 
equally clear that the defendant should not suffer 
by any such improper judgment, if it can be 
avoided in consistency with a due respect to the 
rights of others. It would appear to be exact 
equity to ·set aside acts whi~h have been illegally 
done, if this can be without injury to third per-
sons ; so that all ·parties whom the proceedings 
affect stand in the same position after as before 
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the acts so done. How could Raun insist that his 
judgment, rendered against law, should be en-
forced, when the error can be corrected without 
the slightest injury to him, and when he is re-
instated to all the rights which he had before its 
rendition¥ 
''Accordingly, the principle has been de-
clared in cases innumerable, that when a judgment 
is reversed, the defendant is to be restored to all 
things which he has lost by the judgment. (See 
Jones v. Harker, 5 Mass. 264; Cummings v. Noyes, 
10 Ma!ss. 433.) In Jackson v. Cadwell (1 Cowen, 
644), the Court say, the same reasons of policy 
which secure to an innocent purchaser a valid title 
do not exist when the judgment creditor becomes 
purchaser, and it would be the height of injustice 
to aUow the party guilty of fue irregularity to 
take advantage of it. It is true, that in that case 
the sale was set aside for error's in conducting it, 
but the principle would apply to an erroneous 
judgment, procured by the instrumentality of the 
plaintiff or his ·attorney. 
''So in the case of The Bank of the United 
States v. The Bank of Washington {6· Pet. 19), it 
is said : 'The reversal of the judgement gives a 
new right or cause of action against the parties to 
the judgment, and creates a legal ohligatinn on 
their part to restore what the other party has lost 
by reason of the erroneous judgment, and as be-
tween the parties to the judgment there is all the 
privity necessary to sustain and enforce such 
right.' 
'' Authoritie:s might be multiplied indefinitely, 
to the same effect, but it is unne<cessary. 'The cur-
rent of authority, broken by only a case or two, 
goes directly to the point, that a party obtaining 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
through a judgment, before reversal, any ad-
vantage or benefit, must restore what he got to 
the other party, after the reversal.'' 
The appellants having been successful in reversing 
the judgment appealed from are entitled to complete 
restitution. Restitution is not dependant upon statute, 
and any statute such as Section 104-41-22 U.C.A. 1943 is 
cumulative. This is so stated in Bancroft's Code P~actice 
and Remedies, Yol. 9, Sec. 7449, p. 9802: 
''The remedy of restitution requires restora-
tion of property which one has lost on account of 
the execution of an erroneous judgment, by the 
party who has obtained it. A party to a cause who 
has lost money or property under or by virtue of 
a judgment which is afterwards reversed is en-
titled to res·titution, so as to be placed in statu 
quo with respect to his rights and advantages 
previous to the erroneous judgment. Such re'sti-
tution is generally regarded as ·a matter of right, 
and does not depend upon the merits of the con-
troversy between the parties, the probabilities of 
another judgment to the same effect, or the sol-
vency of the party entitled thereof. 'The defendant 
having been put out of possession by an abuse of 
the proce'ss of the law, the law must he just to it-
self, as well as to the defendant, by restoring him 
to that of which he was wrongfully deprived. 
When the defendant is restored to the possession, 
then, and not until then, will the court be in con-
dition in which it can honorably to itself pass 
upon the further rights of the parties'.'' 
The judgment appealed from, when re'\"ersHd, lacks 
vitality for any purpos·e as pointed out in Larsen vs. 
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Gasber'g, W anren vs. Robison and other authorities cited 
above. It is a void judgment and once the remittitur is 
filed its lack of vitality is shown upon an inspection of 
the judgment-roll. An early California case characterizes 
a void judgm'ent and which requires only an inspection of 
the judgment roll to demonstrate its want of vitality as 
"a dead limb upon the judicia1 tr~e, which should be 
lopped off if the power so to do exists.'' The court has 
inherent power to vacate such a judgment at any time 
and regardless of the expiration of the term at which 
the judgment was entered. This was the holding in the 
cas·e of People v. Gree'YIJ,e et al., 16 Poo. 197, where the 
California court stated: 
"It is conceded by all of the authorities that 
a court will interpose to stay the execution of a 
void judgment. A judgment which is void upon 
its face, and which requires only an inspection of 
the judgment roll to demonstrate its want of 
vitality, is a dead limb upon the judicial tree, 
which should be lopped off if the power so to do 
exists. It can bear no fruit to the plaintiff, but 
is a constant menace to the defendant. It is said 
a court whose process is abused ·by an attempt 
to enforce a void judgment will interfere for its 
own dignity, and for the protection of its officers, 
to arrest further action. Mills v. Dickson, 6 Rich. 
L·aw, 486. The most effectual method of doing 
this i1s by extirpating the judgment itself; by re-
moving a form which is without substance. InN ew 
York, with a statute similar to section 473 of our 
Code, the courts have held that the power to va-
cate a judgment is inherent and is not limited by 
their Code, which only has reference to ordinary 
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defaults, (Dinsmore v. Adams, 48 How. Pr. 274,) 
and that the limitation does not apply to an un-
authorized judgment, nor to a judgment entered 
without service of process, (Simonson v. Blake, 
20 How. Pr. 484.) See cases cited in Wharton v. 
Harlan, supra. In this last case McKinstry, J., 
in commenting upon the ruie enunciated in Bell 
v. Thompson, supra, said: 'This technical rule as 
to action during the same term, never applied to 
a pretended judgment, in fact void, and could 
never have applied to statutory judgments entered 
by the clerk, which may be entered in vacation'." 
The Greene case, supra, reiterates the fundamental 
principle that whenever possibl·e a court should eliminate 
from its files and records anything of a redundant nature 
and should, so to speak, clear out the dead timber so as 
to leave of record only thos·e things that have vitality and 
meaning. But here we have a situation that requires af-
firmative action in order to bring about complete resti-
tution ·on the record. In a suit to quiet title, where real 
property is involved, those things that affect the record 
and constitute clouds on the title become and are the 
controlling matters, and it is the record title that must 
be restored and the clouds on the same ·expunged in order 
to bring about comp'lete restitution. If the judgmHnt was 
one for the payment of money and the money had been 
collected upon execution issued on the judgment sub-
sequently reversed, it would be the money that the losing 
party on appeal would have to return to the successful 
appellant. If the successful appellant had been removed 
from possession by reason of the erroneous judgment, 
then it would he the possession that would have to be re-
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stored. In Pioo v. Cwyas, 48 Cal. 639, the court held that 
a motion address·ed to the trial court was proper to the 
end that the moving party be re·stored to the pos'S'ession 
of a hotel from which he had been dispossessed by reason 
of a judgment subS"equently revers·ed. 'The report of the 
case contains a succinct statement of counsel in support 
of the motion as follows: 
''
1That a plaintiff must restore to his op-
ponent any advantage he obtained through his 
judgment, upon its reversal, is a very ancient 
doctrine. (Jones v. Harker, 5 Mass. 264; Cum-
mings v. Noyes, 10 Mass. 433; Jackson v. Cadwell, 
1 Cowen, 644: Bank of United States v. Bank of 
Washington, 6 Peters, 8.) 
''The Supreme Court of California have in-
dorsed the po1sition in Reynolds v. Harris, 14 Cal. 
667. They have sustained Reynolds v. Harris in 
Polack v. Shafer, ( 46 Cal. 270.)" 
The right to restitution is implied and is not de-
pendent upon any direct order by the appeHate court 
to that ef:fect. The right to make complete restitution is 
inherent in the trial court, notwithstanding the exist·ence 
of the same right in the reviewing court. To this effect 
is 3 Amerioa;n Jurisprudence, p. 746, 8ec.1251: 
''While reviewing courts have inherent 
power, if they see proper, to direct that restitu-
tion be made, they rarely exercise that power; the 
duty of taking and authorizing such steps as may 
be necessary ·to enforce the rights of the appe'l-
lan t arising from the reversal is usually confided 
to the trial court whose judgment was reversed. 
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It is ciear that that court has jurisdiction, while 
the subject of the controversy and the parties are 
before it, to enforce restitution of what a party 
has lost by the enforcement of the judgment, and 
it is its duty to do so. A statutory provi'sion 
authorizing a reviewing court on reversa:l, to make 
restitution of all property and rights lost by the 
judgment reversed, does not preclude the court 
below from exercising the same power. Nor are its 
right and duty to enforce restitution dependent 
upon any direct order for restitution by the appel-
late court. The right to such restitution is implied, 
and in subsequent proceedings for its enforcement 
it need not be shown that, by any mandate or ex-
press order, the reviewing court has directed that 
restitution be made. Moreover, the fact that a 
judgment was reversed for want of jurisdiction 
does not prevent either the reviewing court or the 
trial court from compelling restitution. The court 
whose judgment or ~ecree is .nevers1ed and am-
'fi!Ulled, having by its own act occas~oned the wf"'ong, 
possesses an inherent and summary jurisdiction 
to afford tf1edress without ~refe,enc:e to the pe~culiar 
nature of the controversy which it had erroneously 
dete~rmined." (Italics ours) 
Hayne New Trial ~and A~e1al, Vol. 2, Sec. 308, p. 
1782, cites the Greene case, supra, and states that a void 
judgment requiring no more than a mere inspection of 
the judgment-roll to demonstrate its want of vitality 
can be relieved against at any time, however remote, by 
mere motion. The author states the rule in the fol~owing 
language: 
''But it i'S to be remembered that the pro-
visions of section 473 do not apply to judgments 
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which are void upon their face, and which re-
quire no more than a mere inspection of the 
judgment-roll to demonstrate their want of vital-
ity. It has been said that such judgments are dead 
limbs upon the judicial tree, which should be 
lopped off, if the power so to do can he exercised. 
They hear no fruit for the plaintiff, and are a 
constant menace to the defendant. If the default 
judgment is void on it's face, therefore, and its 
defects apparent on the judgment-roll, there is 
no time limit within which they are required to be 
presented as a ground for the relief contemplated 
by this section. It may be relieved against at any 
time, however remote, by mere motion. 'The at-
tention of the courts need merely to be called to 
that which its own record demonstrates, and the 
judgment, order, or proce-eding will he nullified 
without question.'' 
This court in Ma;ds,en v. M~adsen, 78 Utah 84, 1 Pac. 
2d 946, holds that when the judgment of the trial court 
has been vacated on appeal ''it can only mean that the 
judgment is set aside, vacated, and annulled, and, hav-
ing been thus swept from existence, the lower court has 
no power to breathe into any part of it the breath of 
life.'' The court quotes with approval from other author-
ities to the ef:Dect that the trial court, after a judgment 
has been reversed, should put the litigants hack where 
they were when the initial mistake was committed, and to 
that ~end should retrace its stetps, if necessary, the court 
quoting from the Nebraska court as foll:ows: 
'' 'When the judgment of a trial court has 
been reversed in an error proceeding, the court 
should retrace its steps to the· point where the 
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first material error occurred. It should prut the 
litigants back where they were when the initial 
mistake was committed.' Missouri, K. & T. Trust 
Co. v. Clark, 60 Neb. 406, 83 N. W. 202, 203." 
To the same effect is Hathatway v. McOonk;i;e, 85 
Utah 21, 38 Pac. 2d 300: 
'' • • • The law is wen ·established that, upon 
the reversal of a judgment hecause of lack of 
jurisdiction, the court directing the reversal re-
tains jurisdiction of the parties and the subdect-
matter for the purpose of placing the parties in 
the same position that they were in before the 
judgment so rendered was entered. The law in 
such case is thus stated hy the 8uprem.e Court of 
the United States in the case of Northwestern 
Fuel Co. v. Brock, 139 U. S. 216, 11 8. Ct. 523, 
524, 35 L. Ed. 1'51 : 
'But here the jurisdiction exercised by the 
court below was only to correct by its own order 
that which, according to the judgment of its appel-
late court, it had no authority to do in the first 
instance; and the 1power is inherent in every court, 
whilst the subject of controversy is in its custody, 
and the parties are before it, to undo what it had 
no authority to do originally, and in which it, 
therefore, acted erroneously, apd to restore, so 
far as pos'sible, the parties to their former posi-
tion. Jurisdiction to correct What had been wrong-
fully done must remain with the court so long as 
the parties and the case are properly before it, 
either in the first instance or when remanded to 
it by an appellate tribunal.*** 
'We are of opinion that the proceeding to en-
oree the restitution in the cases mentioned is under 
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the control of the court, and that ·ali needed in-
quiry can be had to guide its judgment in a sum-
mary proceeding, upon motion of the partie's; the 
only requisite being that the opposite party shall 
be heard, so that in directing restitution no fur-
ther wrong be committed. The restitution is not 
made to depend at all upon the question whether 
or not the court rendering the judgment reversed 
acted within or without its jurisdiction.' 
''Other cases where the same doctrine is an-
nounced are 'Texas L. & Irr. Co. v. Sanders et al., 
101 Tex. 616, 111 S. W. 648; Lipp v. Hunt, 29 
Neb. 256, <t5 N. W. 685; Polack v. Shafer, 46 Cal. 
270; Pico v. Cuyas, 48 Cal. 639; Paul v. Arm-
strong, 1 Nev. at page 82.'' * * * 
'' * * * To hold that a court may either grant 
or refuse restitution of property as suits its fancy 
without being advised as to the merits of the con-
troversy would be to substitute caprice for rules 
of law. The petitioners were as a matter of law 
entitled to he restored to the possession of the 
property in question upon the dismissal of the 
action for want of jurisdiction. 
''Defendants further contend that mandamus 
is not the proper remedy to review a matter such 
as that here presented. The que'stion thus pre-
sented is not free from difficulty. It is well es-
tablished that a writ of mandamus may be used 
to compel an inferior tribunal to act on a matter 
within its jurisdiction but not to control its dis-
cretion while acting nor to reverse its judgm·ent 
when made. On the other hand, where a judgment 
is entered, it ·becomes the duty of the court to 
· enforce such judgment, and, in case of its refusal, 
the party aggrieved may by mandamus compel 
its enorcement. There is no discretion in a court 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
23 
as to whether it will or will not enforce its. judg-
ment. Ketchum Coal Co. v. Christensen, 48 Utah, 
214, 159 P. 541." • • • 
• • • ''In order that petitioners may reap the 
full fruits of the reversal of the city court judg-
ment it is necessary that an order of re-restitu-
tion issue placing them as near as may be in the 
same position that they were in before the void 
judgment was rendered. To deny petitioners a 
writ of re-restitution is to deny them rights.which 
for the present are fixed and determined by the 
order dismissing the action. In substance, if not 
in form, the refusal of the court below to grant 
petitioners re-restitution of the premises in dis-
pute was to deny them the right to enforce their 
judgment. In such case the right of petitioners to 
a writ of restitution may be enforced by a 'Pro-
ceeding in mandamus. Ketchum Coal Co. v. Christ-
ensen, supra.'' 
Again bearing in mind that the judgment appealed 
from in the Meagher case affected the title to real prop-
erty and impos·ed costs upon the defendants, who were 
succes·sful in their appeal, the mel"e suggestion of a pos-
sibility that title might be ~louded by the erroneous and 
void judgment should require the formal vacation and 
setting aside thereof. The authorities above stated 
demonstrate the requirement of full and compJete resti-
tution and that a motion to vacate and set aside is an 
appropriate remedy. The respondent trial judge recog-
nized the appropriateness of the motion when he ordered 
the void judgment vacated as against Joe T. Juhan and 
Ashley Valley Oil 'Company. In failing to act upon the 
motion of Ray Phebus he misconstrued the mandate of 
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this court, and to correct that situation mandamus is an 
aprptropriate proceeding. 
3. This Oourt 'Can Construe its Opinion on Applica-
tion tior Writ of Mandamus. 
'This court in W a:rren vs. Rob~son, supra, held: 
''And, where an appeal is taken from a judg-
ment of an inferior court entered under a man-
date of the appellant court, the latter tribunal 
will construe its own mandate in connection with 
its opinion to determine whether the inferior court 
proceeded in accordance therewith.'' Gaines v. 
Rugg, 148 U. S. 228, 13 Sup. Ct. 611, 37 L. Ed. 
432; In re Sanford Ford & Tool Co., supra. 
In Whitney v. Whitney, 181 Pac. 2d 245 (Okl.), tlm 
same rule was announced: 
''In State ex rei. First Nat. Bank vs. Ogden, 
Judge, 173 Okl. 285, 49 P. 2d '565, 566, the rule 
stated in State ex rei Devonian Oil Co. v. Smith, 
Judge, 138 Okl. 89, 280 P. 433, was relied upon 
in holding: 
'It is the province of this court to construe its 
own mandate in connection with its opinion, and, 
if it finds that the trial court has misconstrued 
the same, the mistake may he corrected by writ of 
mandamus from this court'." 
The return or answer to the petition on file herein 
s·tates no fact in justification for failing to set aside the 
judgment suooessfu1ly appealed fl"om as- against Ray 
Phebus. The respondent judge in ,effect says that he 
was under no obligation to vacate the judgment as against 
Phebus, even though he did so as against Juhan and 
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Ashley Valley Oil Company. In this, and if that be the 
contention of the respondent judge, he has attempted 
to construe the decision of this court which, so far as. the 
motion to vacate was concerned, was not his preroga-
tive. The general rule is well stated in American Juris-
prudence, ·y ol. 3, Sec. 1237, p. 733: 
''After the reviewing court has determined 
a case before it and remanded such case to the 
lower court, the latter is without power to modify, 
alter, amend, set aside, or in any manner disturb 
or depart from the judgment of the reviewing 
court, even during the continuance of the term 
in which it was rendered. The judgment of the 
higher court is not reviewable in -any way by the 
court below, in the exercise of its equitable powers, 
or otherwise. The lower court cannot vary or ex-
amine the decree of the higher court for any other 
purpose than execution, give any other or further 
relief; review it, even for apparent error, upon any 
matter decided on appeal; or intermeddle with it, 
further than to settle so much as has been re-
manded. It can only proceed to execute the man-
date and settle so much as remains to be done, 
without rescission or modification. 
"If the lower courts were authorized to dis-
obey the mandate, litigation would never be ended 
and the supreme tribunal of the state would be 
shorn of that authority over the inferior tribunal 
with which it is invested. But the rule has long 
prevailed that there must he an end to the 'litiga-
tion of a particular cause, and that an alleged in-
jured litigant, in order to establish what he may 
deem the justice of the cause, may not have, de 
novo, trial after trial, ad infinitum. * * * '' 
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Also AmeriCium Jurisprudenoe, Vol. 3, Sec. 1229, 
p. 726: 
'' * * * The mandate of the reviewing court, 
or, as it is called in some jurisdictions, the 're-
mittitur' or 'Procedendo,' these terms being used 
synonymously in this sense, remitting the case 
to the lower court is the official mode of communi-
cating its judgment to the inferior tribunal the 
judgment of which has been reviewed. By this 
means, the lower court is advised of the judgment 
or decision of the reviewing court reversing, af-
firming, or modifying the judgment of the lower 
court, and is directed to enforce, or reverse and 
set aside, the judgment, as the case may be.'' 
Als·o Ametricarn Jurispruaence, Vol. 3, Sec. 1234, pp. 
730-731: 
''After a case has been determined by the 
reviewing court, the duty of the latter is to comply 
with the mandate of the former. The mandate of 
the reviewing court is binding on the lower court 
and must be strictly followed and carried into 
effect according to its true intent and meaning, as 
determined hy the directions given by such re-
viewing court. Public interest requires that litiga-
tion shall come t<;> an end speedily, so that when 
a cause has been tried to judgment, and the merits 
of the trial determined upon appeal, the trial 
court, upon remittitur, has no power but to obey 
the judgment of the appellate court. * * *" 
This court, in its decision, in the Meagher case on 
appeal clearly ·states the admitted fact that Ray Phebus 
was one of the appellants. The language of reversal, with 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
costs to the appellants, is clear and unequivoca:l. Beyond 
that the trial court, in view of the authorities stated 
above, can go no further except that in a subsequent 
appropriate proceeding the decision of this court must 
be looked to to determine the law of the cas·e and its 
applicability to subsequent proceedings. As to the man-
date, however, and the reversal of the judgment appealed 
from as to all of the appealing defendants th~ere can be 
no question. In view of the answer filed herein, with all 
of the facts admitted, the reversal by this court does not 
distinguish as between the petitioner Phebus and the 
petitioners Joe T. Juhan and Ashley V a11ey Oil Com-
pany. By ruling upon the motion, granting it as to Juhan 
and Ashley Valley Oil Company and excluding Ray 
Phebus therefrom, the respondent judge acted contrary 
to the mandate of this court. 
4. Mandamus is a Proper Remedy. 
When the trial judge fails or refuses to give effect 
to the remittitur, or misconstrues it, or acts beyond its 
province in carrying it out, it becomes the duty of the 
appellate court to ·enforce compHance by writ of man-
damus. This court in Ketch!um Coal Co. v. Christensen, 
48 Utah 214, 159 Pac. 541, so held: 
''Broadly speaking, superior courts never 
control nor attempt to direct inferior courts or 
tribunals before judgment while acting merely 
judicia1ly or in matters of discretion. After judg-
ment, however, when the inferior court or tribunal 
has exhausted its discretionary powers, the 
superior court will compel the enforcement of 
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judgments, regardless of the nature or character 
of the proceeding. Before an action has proceeded 
to judgment there ordinarily are ample statutory 
remedies provided for the correction of errors of 
judgment and for an abuse of discretion. No such 
remedies are, however, necessary after judgment, 
since, when that point is reached, judicial discre-
tion ends and it then beeomes the duty of the 
courts to enforce their judgments, and if they re-
fuse or neg1:ect to do so mandamus will lie to 
compel them to discharge the duty, which is one 
imposed by law. Any other course would compel 
men, in vindicating their legal rights, to have re-
course to the primitive methods of app~ying brute 
force. Courts are instituted to prevent recourse to 
such methods. But if courts can successfully re-
fuse to do their duty they merely invite men to 
have reeourse to such methods.'' 
In the recent case of Street v. Fourth Judicial Dis-
trict Court, - Utah -, 191 Pac. 2d 153, (Pac. Adv. 
Sheets, Apr. 23, 1948) this court stated: 
"'The rule in this state, and in most other 
jurisdictions, is that resort to mandamus may 
be had to compel an inferior court to comply with 
the mandate of a superior court. The rule was well 
stated in the opinion of Mr. Justice Ephraim Han-
son in the case of Utah Copper Co. v. District 
Court, 91 Utah 377, 64 P. 2d 241, 250: 'The rule 
is well established and there does not seem to 
be anything to the contrary that when a case has 
been determined by a reviewing court and re-
manded to the trial court, the duty of the latter is 
to comply with the mandate of the former. The 
mandate is binding on the lower court and must 
be strictly followed and carried into effect accord-
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ing to its true intent and meaning as determined 
by the directions given by the reviewing court. 
"\Yhen the trial court fails or refuses to obey or 
give effect to the mandate or remittitur, or mis-
construes it or acts beyond its province in carry-
ing it out, it becomes the province and duty of the 
appellate court to enforce compliance therewith, 
and it is generally recognized that such may he 
done on writ or order of mandamus. The lower 
court upon remand of a case from a higher court, 
must obey the mandate or remittitur and render 
judgment in conformity thereto and has no author-
ity to enter any judgment not in conformity with 
the order. Whatever comes before and is decided 
and disposed of by the reviewing court is con-
sidered as finally settled and the inferior court 
to which a mandate issues is bound by the decree 
as the law of the case and must carry it into exe-
cution according to the mandate, and after the re-
viewing court has determined the case befor·e it 
and remanded it to the lower court, the latter is 
without power to modify, alter, amend, set aside, 
or in any manner disturb or depart from the 
judgment of the reviewing court; that the judg-
ment of the higher court is not reviewable in any 
way by the court below and the low·er court can-
not vary or examine the decree of the higher court 
for any other purpose than execution, or give any 
other or further relief or review it even for ap-
parent error upon any matter. decided on app~al, 
or meddle with it further than to settle so much 
as has been .remanded'.'' 
It may .be that the respondents, by thieir answer 
denying any duty to set the judgment aside as to the 
petitioner, Ray Phebus, are relying upon an obvious mis-
take in language used by this court in the M·eagher de-
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mswn. At one place in the decision it is stated: ''On 
January 19, 1945, Phebus quit daimed his interest to 
Juhan.'' This is a correct statement. At another place 
it is stated: ''Phebus apparently has conveyed what in-
terest he has to Meagher.'' That statement is incorrect. 
In the record before this court on ruppeal and before the 
trial court, there was no conveyance from Phebus to 
Meagher. This court, however, did not determine any 
question of title and exp~essly stated that the relinquish-
ment of possible claims does "not, however, affect the 
issues as submitted to us.'' The fact remains that Phebus 
was a moving party in the appeal to this court against 
whom a judgment had been entered determining title, 
awarding costs and enjoining him from asserting any 
claim or title on his part or those claiming under him. 
'This judgment, in its entirety, was reversed and the trial 
judge now refuses to give full effect to remittitur. 'The 
trial judge ho'1ds that the judgment was not reversed 
as to Phebus and, therefore, the necessity of this pro-
ceeding. 
5. Juhan and Ashley VaHey Oil Company Are 
Adversely Affected. 
This court in its decision in the Meagher case states: 
''Briefly the above sets out the chain of title of the 
various parties concerned, leaving as inte~ested parties 
in the proceedings, plaintiff Meagher, and defendants 
Ashley Valley Oil Company and Juhan. Phehus apparent-
ly has conveyed what interest he has to Meagher. It 
may be that some of these transfers and assignments, 
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which so far as the abstract is concerned appear incon-
sistent, are in fact merely efforts to clear title by re-
linquishment of possible claims. They do not, however, 
affect the issues as submitted to us.'' 
The Meagher action was commenced on D·ecember 
5th, 1944. Phebus quitclaimed to Juhan under date of 
January 19, 1945, during 1Jhe pendency of the aCJtion. 
Juhan, in part, claims by, through and under Phebus. 
If the original judgment is permited to stand, then Juhan 
is out of the picture to the ·extent of the interest quit-
claimed to him by Phebus and, regardless of the inten-
tion, the language used by this court and the issues raised 
by the pleadings and at the trial, a question of title will 
have been determined. Juhan has a real and substantial 
interest in requiring the trial judge to s~et aside and 
vacate the judgment heretofore entered against the Peti-
tioner, Phebus, one of the successful appellants from 
that judgment. By the denial of the motion to set aside 
and vacate the judgment, the respondents herein are 
circumventing the mandate and decision of this court. 
CON'CLUSION 
The reSipOndent judge, having acted in part upon 
the motion to vacate the erroneous judgment, should 
now be required by the order of this court to clarify the 
record as to the Petitioner, Phebus. 'To do otherwise 
would be to permit the respondent Meagher to gain an 
advantage not contemplat~ed by the issues raised and 
would result in his being able to turn to his advantage a 
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void judgment. The trial judge, having presumed to act 
upon the motion to vacate, should now be required to 
grant the motion in its entirety and, to that end, an un-
qualified writ of mandamus or order should issue from 
this court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GUSTIN and RICHARDS 
Attorneys for Ray Phebus 
and Joe T. Juhan 
INGEBRETSEN, RAY, 
RAWLINS & CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Ash~ey Valley 
Oil Company 
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